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TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION-PROBLEMS CREATED 
BY THE COMPLEX TRUST PROVISIONS OF THE 1954 CODE-The provi-
sions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 for the taxation of the 
income of trusts are the most extensive revisions ever made in this tax 
area. Although the general pattern of taxing trusts as separate taxable 
entities on a conduit principle is continued, the new law in effect codi-
fies what was previously set out in a single statutory section1 and in regu-
lations,2 case decisions, and Treasury rulings and decisions. While most 
of the problems arising under the 1939 code have been solved in the new 
law, some have properly been neglected while others .are left to be 
determined through litigation. This comment will not be expository 
of all of the trust provisions but rather will attempt to deal with some 
of the more important interpretative difficulties likely to be encountered 
in the new law involving the taxation of the income of those trusts 
which may accumulate income, distribute corpus, or pay or set aside 
amounts for charitable purposes. It will be assumed that the reader is 
familiar with the basic statutory pattern of the trust sections of the new 
code.3 
ll.R.C. (1939), §162. 
2Treas. Reg. 118, §39.162. 
3 The general statutory plan of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code sections involving 
complex trusts is: §§641-643, general rules for taxation of estates and trusts; §§661-663, 
estates and trusts which may accumulate income or which distribute corpus; and §§665-668, 
treatment of excess distributions by trusts. 
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I. Exclusion from Taxation of Certain Gi~s and Bequests 
Not all distributions from income or corpus are treated as distribu-
tions taxable to the extent of distributable net income. An exception 
is made in the case of certain gifts or bequests. The 1954 code excludes 
as an income distribution any amount which, under the terms of the 
governing instrument, is (I) payable as a gift or bequest of a specific 
sum of money or specific property; (2) payable to a beneficiary in a 
lump sum or in not more than three instalments; and (3) not payable 
only from the income of the trust. 4 
As the distributions which are excludable are limited to three in-
stalments, there arises a question as to what type of distribution will be 
considered an instalment. What the courts will interpret as an "instal-
ment" is speculative. An answer can be predicated on the idea that 
Congress, in allowing three instalments, considered four or more sepa-
rate payments as something other than a bequest or gift of a single 
amount. It would appear that a distribution which would continue 
intermittently over more than a taxable year would at least approach 
something beyond a lump sum payment. However, from the statutory 
language of this section, which refers to amounts payable "under the 
terms of the governing instrument,"5 it appears that the exemption 
should not be lost by virtue of any subsequent arrangements between 
the beneficiary and the trustee. Hence an instalment might be divided 
up and paid at intervals spanning a period greater than a year if the 
trustee and beneficiary so agree. In all probability, additional current 
payments to a beneficiary will not be regarded as instalments. Thus, a 
beneficiary who gets yearly distributions of income plus a lump sum 
payment of $10,000 on his marriage will not be taxed on the latter 
distribution as the annual distributions would not be considered in-
stalments. 
Since Congress indicated no time limitation for the spacing of the 
instalments, it follows that they need not be at specific times so long 
as the payments are kept below four in number. If the trustee is per-
mitted to distribute the payments at his discretion, the distributions 
would be taxable. If he is required by the governing instrument to 
distribute in three instalments, payable at a time which he feels is 
proper, the exclusion for gifts or bequests would apply. Discretion will 
be allowed to exist, apparently, as to the time of payment of a specified 
three or less instalments, but discretion will not be permitted as to the 
4 I.R.C. (1954), §663(a)(I). 
Ii Ibid. 
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amount of the instalments. Likewise, the exemption will not operate 
where three payments are specified and more are allowed at the trus-
tee's discretion, as this would be doing indirectly what could not be 
accomplished directly. 
II. Separate Shares of Beneficiaries 
A concept of separate shares, applicable only to complex trusts, was 
introduced for the first time by the 1954 code. Where a single com-
plex trust has more than one beneficiary, substantially separate and 
independent shares of different beneficiaries in the trust are treated as 
separate trusts, but only for the purpose of determining the amount of 
distributable net income which is taxable to each beneficiary.6 The 
object of this subsection is to prevent a beneficiary from being taxed 
on a distribution of corpus by reason of the fact that trust income is 
being accumulated specifically for another beneficiary.7 A defect exist-
ing under prior law is thus eliminated. By way of illustration, suppose 
a trust has distributable net income of $10,000 and income beneficiaries 
A and B, and the trustee (I) pays $5,000 of the income to A, (2) 
accumulates B's $5,000 share of income for distribution to him in the 
future, and (3) pays A $5,000 from the corpus in a discretionary dis-
bursement. Were it not for this provision, A would be taxed on $10,000 
rather than $5,000 although the latter figure represents the share of 
income intended for him. Other variations in the use of this section are 
numerous. The grantor may be allowed to allocate different classes of 
distributable net income to different beneficiaries, with one beneficiary 
getting income from tax-exempt securities and the other receiving the 
remaining income. 8 The rules by which to determine the existence of 
substantially separate and independent shares,9 and their manner of 
treatment, are matters which are left to the Treasury to prescribe by 
regulations.10 
s I.R.C. (1954), §663(c). 
7 S. Rep. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 84, 355 (1954). 
s See "Federal Income Tax Statute," 2 AL.I. 131, 417, 442 (February 1954 dra.ft) 
for an explanation of further possibilities of this section. The AL.I. proposal in regard to 
the treatment of separate shares is almost identical to that which Congress adopted. 
9 ''The determination, however, should have to be made only once, based on the 
terms of the instrument and the likeliliood of various contingencies; it should not depend 
yearly on the actual occurrence or non-occurrence of the contingency. A share should not 
normally be treated as substantially separate and independent one year, and not so separate 
the next." Id. at 445. 
10 I.R.C. (1954), §663(c). 
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Although the separate share provision is not intended to alter the 
determination of the existence of separate trusts, 11 conflict between 
these two concepts seems inevitable. Congress has indicated that the 
test for determining the existence of separate shares should be founded 
on whether the grantor has clearly intended each beneficiary to have a 
definite share.12 However, the manifested intent of the grantor is also 
the test for ascertaining how many separate taxable trusts have been 
created by one trust instrument.13 The courts will be forced to draw 
a £ne, artificial hairline between the intent needed to create separate 
and independent shares and the intent needed to create more than one 
trust. In the former, the separate interests are treated as separate shares 
only for the purpose of allocating distributable net income and cannot 
be applied to obtain multiple personal exemptions or to allow the split-
ting of undistributed income into multiple shares for purposes of being 
taxed at lower bracket rates.14 In multiple trusts these advantages are 
available. In determining whether multiple trusts have been created 
by a single trust instrument from a single corpus, evidentiary facts out-
side the trust instrument will be significant, particularly the separate 
or joint character of the accounts and records maintained.15 
Rather than attempt to demonstrate in the trust instrument the 
intent required for the creation of separate shares, it is recommended 
that a grantor of a complex trust having several beneficiaries reach for 
the more fruitful tax advantage offered in creating multiple trusts. A 
simple statement in the instrument that it is the grantor's intention to 
create multiple trusts would seemingly accomplish this objective. 
III. The Fi11e-Y ear Throwback Rule 
In selecting a means by which to check the practice of accumulat-
ing income for tax-saving purposes, Congress has chosen the concept:16 
11 S. Rep. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. 355 (1954). 
12 Id. at 85. 
13 United States Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 481, 56 S.Ct. 329 (1936); 
Helvering v. Mcilvaine, 296 U.S. 488, 56 S.Ct. 332 (1936); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. 
Kelly, (3d Cir. 1939) 102 F. (2d) 333. 
14 S. Rep. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. 355 (1954). 
15 United States Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 481, 56 S.Ct. 329 (1936); 
Helms Bakeries, 46 B.T.A. 308 (1942), acq. in 1942-1 Cum. Bul. 8; Hale v. Dominion 
Nat. Bank, (6th Cir. 1951) 186 F. (2d) 374. See KENNEDY, FEDERAL lNcoME TAXATION 
OP TnusTs AND EsTATEs §1.16 (1948), for a detailed consideration of multiple trusts. 
16 Another possible solution for income taxation of trusts is to tax all undistributed 
trust income at the maximum surtax rate. This idea was explored in James, "Irascible 
Comments on the Revenue Laws," 9 Umv. Cm. L. REv. 58 at 63 (1941). "No one has 
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of distributable net income and the five-year throwback rule to replace 
the impractical 65-day and 12-month rules of former law.17 Under 
the new code, if distributions exceed current distributable net income 
. by more than $2,000, the entire excess over distributable net income 
will be thrown back in each of the :five preceding years (in inverse 
order) and taxed to the beneficiaries to the extent that distributable 
net income in those years was not, in fact, distributed. This tax is not 
allowed to be more than it would have been had the beneficiary actually 
received the additional amounts in the preceding years. A double tax 
on the income is eliminated by allowing the beneficiary a credit for the 
proportionate part of the tax paid by the trustee in the prior years.18 
A. Exceptions to the Rule. Absolute as it is, Congress has per-
mitted four major exceptions to the throwback rule. First, the rule 
will not apply to amounts accumulated before the beneficiary's birth or 
before he reaches the age of twenty-one.19 This will permit the trustees 
to pay for the support and maintenance of a beneficiary until he reaches 
his twenty-first birthday. No particular difficulty arises in the case of 
small accumulations, but in so limiting the exception, it would seem 
that the drafters were under the generally unfounded apprehension 
that upon becoming twenty-one a beneficiary becomes competent to 
handle money. In effect, the present throwback rule approaches equat-
ing the law of the nation with that of New York20 and a few other 
states,21 where accumulations of income are not permitted except dur-
ing the minority of a beneficiary. 
The following example illustrates a problem created by the excep-
tion just described. A trust is established to accumulate income for a 
beneficiary who is a minor, the accumulation to continue until the 
beneficiary is thirty years old. The accumulated income is then over a 
ever advanced any reason for taxing trusts af the same rate as individuals, and no serious 
constitutional questions would be raised by taxing them at different rates. If the undistrib-
uted income of private trusts were taxed, let us say, at a basic rate of 80 per cent, the income 
of such trusts would be forced out and distributed to beneficiaries." 
17 I.R.C. (1939), §§l62(d)(2), 162(d)(3). To alleviate hardships on trusts which 
were created in reliance on the 65-day rule of prior law, fiduciaries of trusts existing prior 
to January 1, 1954 can irrevocably elect to adhere to the pre-65 day rule, if by the terms of 
the trust, amounts in excess of income of the preceding taxable year may not be distributed 
in any taxable year. I.R.C. (1954), §663(b). 
1s I.R.C. (1954), §§665-668. 
19 I.R.C. (1954), §665(b)(l). 
20 49 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1945) §§6la, 62, 63; 40 N.Y. Consol. Laws 
(McKinney, 1949) §§16, 17, 17a. 
21 For a collection of the statutes on accumulations in force in the United States, see 
4 PROPERTY REsTATEMEN'l', c. 36, topic 1 (1944); 1948 SUPPLEMENT REsTATEMEN'I', 
Property note, c. 36, topic 1 (1949). 
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period of ten years gradually dispersed to the beneficiary, together with 
distributions of the entire current income. How will it be ascertained 
what part of the distribution constitutes accumulated income which is 
exempt from the throwback rule? What part constitutes accumulated 
income subject to the throwback rule because accumulated in the nine 
years after the exemption expires? As the trustee or beneficiary should 
not be permitted to classify the accumulated income arbitrarily, it would 
be advisable that some definite standard be adopted. If the exempt 
accumulation is deemed to be distributed on a first-in first-out theory, 
the throwback rule could have no application. During the first five 
years of distributions, from age thirty to thirty-five, there would be no 
undistributed net income since all current income is being distributed. 
Hence, when the accumulated income theoretically subject to the throw-
back rule is subsequently distributed from ages thirty-five to forty there 
is no period into which the undistributed net income may be thrown 
back as the rule is limited to a period of .five years. It can thus be seen 
that an application of a FIFO method of accounting would, in some 
instances, defeat the effort to prevent tax avoidance. Employment of 
either a method of rateable apportionment of each _class of accumulated 
income during the ten years, or a last-in first-out theory, would reduce 
the possibility of tax avoidance. The Senate has indicated that this 
problem should be clarified by the regulations.22 
Further complications are raised by this section when income is 
accumulated for a beneficiary who never comes into being or fails to 
reach the age of twenty-one. It might be argued that this exemption 
applies only to the specified beneficiary, and that when the accumu-
. lated income is distributed to other beneficiaries the exemption from the 
operation of the throwback rule is lost. However, since these accumu-
lations might be made in reliance on the exemption from the throw-
back rule, the purpose of the rule would not be defeated if the subse-
quent beneficiaries were to be given the benefit of the exempted 
accumulations. It is likely, therefore, that once the exemption for 
accumulations is obtained it will never be lost as to that accumulation 
if the original trust provision was not created as a tax avoidance device 
for the subsequent beneficiaries. 
Another statutory exception to the throwback provision is applied 
to amounts payable to a beneficiary to meet the "emergency" needs of 
such beneficiary.23 The specific facts and circumstances that will give 
22 S. Rep. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. 357 (1954). 
23 I.R.C. (1954), §665(b)(2). 
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rise to an "emergency" will only be determined through continued 
litigation. The Senate indicated that unforeseen or unforeseeable cir-
cumstances requiring immediate help would qualify if ~e beneficiary 
was in actual need of a distribution. The courts will in all probability 
make use of previous decisions of state courts which have interpreted 
trust instruments containing similar emergency provisions.24 Clearly 
the emergency test should be a subjective one. Reason dictates that a 
"high income" bracket beneficiary, temporarily short of liquid resources, 
should be able to get the necessary $100,000 to prevent the foreclosure 
of the mortgage on his mansion as readily as a "low income" bracket 
beneficiary is able to get $3,000 to retain his homestead. 
The third exception to the throwback rule takes the form of amounts 
payable at specified ages, if (I) there can be no more than four such 
distributions to such beneficiary, (2) the period between distribu-
tions is at least four years, and (3) such distributions were specifi-
cally required by the trust instrument on January I, 1954.25 This sub-
section was included to prevent inequities to existing trusts in which 
provision had been made for the benefit of minors and dependents, the 
typical case being that in which the trustee is directed to accumulate 
the income for a limited period and pay to the beneficiary only those 
amounts that he, the trustee, might deem necessary. It was felt that 
such trusts had legitimate purposes.26 These trusts were generally not 
within the gift exclusion as they were not gifts of specific sums of 
money27 but rather sums determinable by the trustee. 
The last exclusion from the throwback rule is a final distribution 
made more than nine years after the date of the last transfer to the 
trust.28 Originally this provision was similar to the Clifford regulations29 
in providing for a period of ten years, but it was changed to nine at 
the last minute. Those regulations, now embodied in the code, pro-
vide that where a grantor creates a trust for the life of the beneficiary, 
24See Dobbin's Estate, 148 Pa. Super. 177, 24 A. (2d) 641 (1942), where the right 
of the cestui of a spendthrift trust to withdraw sums "in the event of emergency" was held 
to warrant withdrawal to prevent foreclosure of a mortgage on property which would result 
in the loss of a large investment of the cestui. In Lyter v. Vestal, 355 Mo. 457, 196 S.W. 
(2d) 769 (1946), the court held that a provision for an "emergency" withdrawal from 
the trust corpus referred to a situation in which the £nancial resources of a widow, including 
her income from the trust estate, were in such a state of insufficiency that encroachment 
was immediately necessary. See also In re Shiel's Will, 120 N.Y.S. (2d) 632 (1953). 
25 I.R.C. (1954), §665(b)(3). 
26 S. Rep. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. 86 (1954). For the congressional hearing 
that gave rise to the passage of this subsection, see S. Hearing on H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 
2d sess., part IV, p. 1830 (1954). 
21 I.R.C. (1954), §663(a)(I). 
2BJ.R.C. (1954), §665(b)(4). 
20 Treas. Reg. ll8, §39.22(a)-21 as now incorporated in I.R.C. (1954), §673 et seq. 
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retaining for himself the reversionary interest, and the beneficiary dies 
before the passing of ten years, the trust is valid for Clifford purposes 
even though it could reasonably be expected that the beneficiary would 
not live for the full ten years. 30 In enacting the new code, the Senate 
apparently overlooked this consideration. The inclusion of a provision 
making an exception such as the one appearing in the Clifford regu-
lations would merely qualify the nine-year limitation. It would not 
interfere with the intended function of the limitation, which was to 
prevent the establishment of trusts for accumulating income and mak-
ing final distributions within reasonably short periods so as to avoid 
the throwback rule. As the law now stands at present, if a grantor 
creates a trust for a person with a life expectancy of not more than nine 
years, and the income is accumulated because it is not then needed by 
the beneficiary, the five-year throwback rule will operate to tax the 
accumulated income when the beneficiary dies within the nine-year 
period. 
Under this section as it is specifically written a transfer of a small 
gift to the trust by a third party, when authorized by the trust instru-
ment, will apparently prevent the application of this exemption from 
the throwback rule. It would seem that Congress neglected to consider 
this. The provision should have included the additional words "by the 
grantor" at the end of the statutory sentence. 
B. Effectiveness of the Rule. There is little doubt that the throw-
back rule is a penalty provision which has rendered a trust to accumu-
late fairly impotent as a tax avoidance device for beneficiaries subject 
to high surtaxes. Nevertheless, there seems to be some question 
whether the complexity of the throwback provision will prevent its 
practical administration. The simplest throwback problem will burden 
the average fiduciary with paper work. When further factors are added 
such as charitable distributions, net capital losses, extraordinary and 
taxable stock dividends, dividends-received credit, foreign income, and 
different levels of distribution to a number of beneficiaries, the possi-
bility that a fiduciary will be buried is not too remote. 
As extensive as the five-year throwback rule is, there are still some 
situations where it does not operate properly. For example, it can be 
avoided by an arrangement whereby the trust accumulates all of its 
income for several years and then distributes only the current income 
for five years. In the next year the accumulated income is distributed 
so Ibid. 
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to the beneficiaries tax free since no undistributed net income existed 
for any of the prior five years. 
How the throwback rule will work out in actual practice is difficult 
to predict. It is possible that in a given case it will work to the advan-
tage of the beneficiary. If the trust is in a high bracket in the taxable 
year in which it receives income, but the beneficiary is in a low bracket 
in the taxable year in which he receives the accumulated income, the 
beneficiary will get a windfall of the proportionate part of the trust's 
tax as a credit against his entire tax liability regardless of the source of 
his income. If, in the year that the trust receives the income, the tax 
bracket of the trust is substantially higher than that of the beneficiary 
in his taxable year, it is even possible that the credit will completely 
cover the beneficiary's outside income.31 
IV. Conclusion 
In all probability there will be a Revenue Act of 1955 which will 
make the necessary technical amendments to close the scattered loop-
holes and clarify the ambiguities of the present statute. With the in-
troduction by the 1954 code of new principles of taxing complex trusts, 
problems have been created for the draftsman of trust instruments. 
Cautious drafting, motivated by legitimate trust objectives rather than 
by tax avoidance aims, will yield fair and equitable taxation, the con-
gressional goal in enacting the new code. How well the renovated 
theory of the new code will work will not be known until the law has 
had an opportunity to be tried in practice. We will have to wait and see. 
Harvey A. Howard, S.Ed. 
31 For a detailed illustration of this possibility, see RBsBARCH lNsnTUTB OI' AM:muCA, 
1954 RBVENCJB Aar CooRDINATon, ,i54 G407 (1954). 
